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GENERALSHIP
by
BARBARA W. TUCHMAN

(Editor's Note: On 3 April 1972, Mrs. Barbara
W. Tuchman spoke at the US Army War
College as part o f the evening lecture
program. In her remarks she made some very
astute observations on the qualities and

characteristics required of high military
leaders. She extended her remarks by
explaining her views on the role and influence
o f the military in our society. Her thoughtful
observations served to broaden the horizons
o f all who heard her by exposing them to a
clearly expressed point o f view which varies
from that held by many military officers. We
found her presentation to be stimulating,
enlightening, and provocative, and we are
pleased t o publish her remarks in
Parameters.)

Mrs. Barbara W(ertheim) Tuchman was born 30
January 1912 in New York City. She holds a BA
degree from Radcliffe College and Honorary Doctor of
Literature degrees from a number of prominent
universities in the United States. She has written
numerous distinguished books and articles that have
earned for her an enviable reputation throughout the
world as a sophisticated
historian
a n d skillful
storyteller. In 1963 Mrs.
Tuchman received the Pulitzer
Prize for nonfiction for The
Guns o f August. In 1971 her
book S t i l w e l l and t h e
American Experience in
China, 1 9 1 1-45 attracted
worldwide attention and
earned for her a second
Pulitzer Prize.

My subject tonight was suggested by your
C o m m a n d a n t w i t h n o accompanying
explanation; just the word "Generalship,"
unadorned. No doubt he could safely assume
that the subject in itself would automatically
interest this audience in the same way that
motherhood would interest an audience of
pregnant ladies. I do not know whether
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General Davis thought the subject would be
appropriate for me because I am the
biographer of a general who vividly illustrated
certain qualities of generalship, both in their
presence and their absence, or whether he had
something of larger scope in mind.
In any event, as I considered the subject I
became intrigued for several reasons: because
it is important, because it is elusive, and
because it is undergoing, I think, as a result of
developments of the past 25 years, a radical
transformation which may make irrelevant
much of what we now know about it. I will
come to that aspect later.
I should begin by saying that I have no
greater qualification in this matter than if you
had asked Tennyson to lecture on generalship
because he wrote "The Charge of the Light
Brigade." I did not write the biography of
Stilwell in his capacity as soldier, but rather in
his capacity as a focal figure and
extraordinarily apt representative of the
American relation to China. I did not write
The Guns o f August as a study of how war
plans go wrong-at least I did not know I was
doing that until it was all over. I am not
primarily a military historian, and to the
degree that I am one at all, it is more or less
by accident. However, since life is only fun
when you attempt something a little beyond
your reach, I will proceed with the
assignment.

determine what the qualities are, to locate
them in the candidates for generalship, and to
ensure that the possessors and the positions
meet.
I have also seen it said that senior
command in battle is the only total human
activity because it requires equal exercise of
the physical, intellectual and moral faculties
at the same time. I tried to take this dictum
apart (being by nature, or perhaps by
profession, given t o challenging all
generalizations) and to think of rivals for the
claim, but in fact no others will do.
Generalship in combat does uniquely possess
that distinction.
QUALITIES GENERALSHIP REQUIRES

The qualities it requires divide themselves
into two categories as I see it: those of
character, that is, personal leadership, and
those of professional capacity. When it comes
to command in the field, the first category is
probably more important than the second,
although it is useless, of course, if separated
from the second, and vice versa. The most
brilliant master of tactics cannot win a battle
if, like General Boulanger, he has the soul of a
subaltern. Neither can the most magnetic and
dashing soldier carry the day if, like General
Custer, he is a nincompoop in deployment.
Courage, according to the Marchale de
Saxe, is the first of all qualities. "Without it,"
as he says undeniably, "the others are of little
value since they cannot be used." I think
courage is too simple a word. The concept
must include both physical and moral
courage, for there are some people who have
the former without the latter, and that is not
enough for generalship. Indeed, physical
courage must also be joined by intelligence,
for as a Chinese proverb puts it, "A general
who is courageous and stupid is a calamity."
Physical, combined with moral, courage
makes the possessor resolute, and I would
take issue with De Saxe and say that the
primary quality is resolution. That is what
enables a man to prevail-over circumstances,
over subordinates, over allies, and eventually
over the enemy. It is the determination to win
through, whether in the worst circumstance

THE IMPORTANCE OF GENERALSHIP

In Colonel Heinl's Dictionary of Military
Quotations, the subject headings "Generals"
and "Generalship" together take up more
space than any other entry. If the closely
r e l a t e d headings " Command" a n d
"Leadership" are added, the subject as a
whole takes up twice as many pages as any
other. Why is it so important? The answer is, I
suppose, because the qualities that enter into
the exercise of generalship in action have the
power, in a very condensed period of time, to
determine the life or death of thousands, and
sometimes the fate of nations. The general's
qualities become, then, of absorbing interest
not only to the military but to citizens at
large, and it is obviously vital to the state to
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Custer's Last Stand

merely to survive or in a limited situation to
complete the mission, but whatever the
circumstance, to prevail. It is this will to
prevail, I think, that is the sine qua non of
military action. If a man has it, he will also
have, or he will summon from somewhere, the
courage to support it. But he could be brave
as a lion and still fail if he lacks the necessary
will.
Will was what Stilwell had, the absolute,
unbreakable, unbendable determination to
fulfill the mission no matter what the
obstacles, the antagonists or the frustrations.
When the road that he fought to cut through
Burma at last reached China, after his recall, a
message from his successor recognized that
the first convoy to make the overland passage,
though Stilwell wasn't there to see it, was the
product of "your indomitable will."
Sensible men will say that will must be
schooled by judgment lest it lead to greater
investment of effort or greater sacrifice than
the object is worth, or to blind persistence in
an objective whose very difficulties suggest it

was a mistake from the start. That is true
enough; good judgment is certainly one
among the essentials of generalship, perhaps
the most essential, according to the naval
historian Raymond O'Connor. He quotes C.
P. Snow's definition of judgment as "the
ability to think of many matters at once, in
t h e i r i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , their related
i m p o r t a n c e , and their consequences."
Judgment may not always be that rational,
but more intuitive, based on a feel of the
situation combined with experience.
Sometimes judgment will counsel boldness,
as when Admiral Nimitz, against the advice of
every admiral and general in his command,
insisted on assaulting Kwajalein, site of the
Japanese Headquarters at the very heart of
the Marshall archipelago, although this meant
leaving the enemy-held outer islands on the
American line of communications. In the
event, American planes were able to keep the
outer islands pounded down while Kwajalein
proved relatively undefended because the
Japanese, thinking along the same lines as
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one after the other on the French frontiers in
August 1914, and with the French Army
streaming back in chaotic retreat and the
enemy invading, judgment might have raised
the question whether France was not beaten.
T h a t never occurred to the
Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, who
possessed in unsurpassed degree a quality of
g r e a t importance for generals-he was
unflappable. Steadiness of temperament in a
general is an asset at any time and the crown
of steadiness is the calm that can be
maintained amid disaster. It may be that
Joffre's immunity to panic was lack of
imagination, or he may have suffered all the
time from what Stilwell called "that sinking
feeling," and concealed it. We do not know
because he kept no diary. Whatever the source
of his imperturbability, France was fortunate
to have it in the right man at the right time.
Certainly it was Gallieni who saw and seized
the opportunity to retrieve disaster, and Foch
and Franchet d'Esperey who supplied the elan
to carry it through, but it was Joffre's
p o n d e r o u s , p i n k - c h e e k e d , immovable
assurance that held the army in being.

General Joseph W. Stillwell

Nimitz's subordinates, had convinced
themselves the Americans would not attempt
to assault it.
More often than not, however, judgment
counsels "Cannot" while will says "Can." In
extremity the great results are gained when
will overrides judgment. Will alone carried
Washington through the winter of Valley
Forge, that nadir of misery and neglect, and
only his extraordinary will kept the freezing,
half-starved, shoeless army, unpaid and
unprovisioned by the Continental Congress,
from deserting. Judgment would have said,
"Go home." I suppose it was will that dragged
Hannibal over the Alps although judgment
might have asked what would happen after he
gained his goal, just as judgment might have
advised Stilwell that his mission-the
mobilizing of an effective Chinese army under
t h e regime o f Chiang Kai-shek was
unachievable. Hannibal too failed in his
objective: he never took Rome, but he has
been called the greatest soldier of all time.
Sometimes the situation calls for will that
simply says, "I will not be beaten"-and here
too; in extremity, it must override judgment.
After the awful debacle of four battles lost

Marshall Joffre
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you can tell has been drawn from a soldier's
experience. It closely fits, I think, the most
nearly perfect, or at any rate the
l e a s t - s n a f u e d , professional military
performance of our time that of the Israelis in
the Six-Day War of 1967.
In that microcosm, caught for us within the
visible limits of six days, the qualities of
resolution and nerve, the "Do this" factor,
the deployment of expert skills, and a
governing intelligence "strong and fertile in
devices," all meshed and functioned together
like the oiled parts of an engine. I need not go
into the circumstances that made this happen,
of which the chief one perhaps was that no
retreat or defeat was possible-either would
have meant annihilation in that sliver of a
country the size of the state of Massachusetts.
The Israelis' concept of generalship, however,
does contain principles that can apply beyond
their borders. To anticipate is one. "To be a
general is to lead," as the commander of the
Jerusalem district put it to me, "and to lead
one must be ahead, ahead, too, of what
occurs." A general, he said, must be skeptical,
c r i t i c a l , flexible, and finally
obstinate-obstinate in the execution of his
mission.
This quality, which I have already
mentioned in connection with Stilwell,
seemed to be the requirement which the
Israelis most emphasized in an officer. Youth
in generals was another. There are no active
Israeli generals over the age of 46, and the
General Staff is on an average probably the
youngest in the world. This is deliberate
policy reflecting the military leaders' tense
consciousness that on them may depend at
any moment their nation's actual existence, in
a sense not true of a country like ours which
is spread over a continent and walled by two
oceans. In Israel they cannot afford to
maintain generalship at less than a peak of
alertness, never satisfied, constantly
improving.
The principle I found stressed above all
others, although more on the planning level
than in the field, was knowledge of the
enemy-of his capabilities, his training, his
psychology-as complete and precise as
prolonged study, familiarity, and every means

Without him there might have been no army
to make a stand at the Marne.
High on the list of a general's essentials is
what I call the "Do this" factor. It is taken
from the statement which Shakespeare put in
the mouth of Mark Anthony: "When Caesar
says, 'Do this,' it is performed." This quality
of command rests not only on the general's
knowledge of tactics and terrain and resources
and enemy deployment in a specific situation,
but on the degree of faith that his
subordinates have in his knowledge. "When
Stilwell told you what to do in Burma," said
an officer, "you had confidence that was the
right thing to do. That is what a soldier wants
to know." If officers and men believe a
general knows what he is talking about and
that what he orders is the right thing to do in
the circumstances, they will do it, because
most people are relieved to find a superior on
whose judgment they can rest. That indeed is
the difference between most people and
generals.
I come now to the second category; that is,
professional ability. This encompasses the
capacity to decide the objective, to plan, to
organize, to direct, to draw on experience and
to deploy all the knowledge and techniques in
which the professional has been trained. For
me to go further into this aspect and enter on
a discussion of the professional principles of
generalship does not, I think, make much
sense; first, because if you do not know more
about them than I do, you oughtn't to be
here, and second, because it seems to me very
difficult to select absolutes. The principles
depend to a great extent on time, place and
history, and the nature of the belligerents. I
will only say that the bridge that joins the
t w o categories- that connects personal
leadership t o professional ability-is
intelligence, which is the quality De Saxe put
second on his list after courage.
The kind of intelligence varies, I suppose,
according to occupation: in a doctor it must
be sympathetic; in a lawyer it is invariably
pessimistic; in a historian it should be
accurate, investigative and synthesizing. In a
military man, according to De Saxe's fine
phrase, it should be "strong and fertile in
devices." I like that; it is a requirement which
6

one big engineering project. There are people
on the other side-with strengths and will that
we never bothered to measure. As a result of
that omission we have been drawn into a
g r e a t e r , a n d certainly more ruinous,
belligerent action than we intended. To fight
w i t h o u t understanding the opponent
ultimately serves neither the repute of the
military nor the repute of the nation.

of intelligence-gathering could make it. In this
realm the Israelis have the advantage of
knowing in advance the identity of the
enemy: he lives next door. Yet it seems to me
that Americans could learn from this lesson.
If we paid more attention to the nature,
motivation and capabilities, especially in Asia,
of the opponent whom we undertake so
confidently to smash-not to mention of the
allies whom we support-we would not have
made such a mess, such an unexpected mess
in Vietnam. We would not have found
ourselves, to our confusion and dismay,
investing more and more unavailing effort
against a continually baffling capacity for
resistance, and not only resistance but
initiative. In the arrogance of our size, wealth
and superior technology, we tend to overlook
the need to examine what may be different
sources of strength in others. If in 1917 Edith
Cavell could say "Patriotism is not enough,"
we now need another voice of wisdom to tell
us, "Technology is not enough." War is not

GENERALSHIP I N TERMS OF THE PRESENT

Having brought myself down to the present
with a rush, I would like to examine
generalship from here on in terms of the
present. I know that military subjects are
generally studied and taught by examples
from the past, and I could go on with an
agreeable talk about the qualities of the Great
Captains w i t h suitable maxims from
Napoleon, and references to General Grant,
and anecdotes about how King George, when
told that General Wolfe was mad, replied, "I

President Nixon in the White House with Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense; General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.,
Chief of Staff, US Army; and Major General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., newly designated Vice Chief of Staff, US Army.
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The change has been taking place over the
past twenty years, while we lived through it
without really noticing-at least I as a civilian
didn't notice. One needs to step outside a
phenomenon in order to see its shape and one
needs perspective to be able to look back and
say, "There was the turning point." As you
can now see, Korea was our first political war.
The train of events since then indicates that
the role of the military is coming to be, as
exhibited by the Russians in Egypt and
ourselves in Southeast Asia, one of
intervention in underdeveloped countries on a
so-called "advisory" or "assistance" level with
the object of molding the affairs of the client
country to suit the adviser's purpose. The role
has already developed its task force and
training program in the Military Assistance
Officers Program at Fort Bragg. According to
its formulation, the task is to "assist foreign
countries with internal security problems"-a
nice euphemism for counterinsurgency- "and
perform functions having sociopolitical
impact on military operations."
In short, the mission of the military in this
sociopolitical era is to be counterrevolution,
otherwise the thwarting of communism, or if
euphemism is preferred, nation-building,
Vietnamizing, or perhaps Pakistanizing or
Africanizing some willing or unwilling client.
This is quite a change from defense of the
continental United States which the founders
intended should be our only military
function.

wish he would bite some other of my
generals"-all of which you already know.
Besides, it might well be an exercise in the
obsolete, for with the change in war that has
occurred since mid-Twentieth Century, there
m u s t necessarily follow
a change in
generalship.
The concept of total war that came in with
o u r c e n t u r y - t h e Terrible Twentieth,
Churchill called it-has already, I think, had
its day. It has been backed off the stage by
the advent of the total weapon, nuclear
explosion, with its uncritical capacity for
overkill. Since, regardless of first strike, there
is enough nuclear power around to be
mutually devastating to both sides, it becomes
the weapon that can't be used, thus creating a
new situation. If war, as we have all been
taught, is the pursuit of policy by means of
force, we are now faced by the fact that there
can be no policy or political object which can
be secured with benefit by opening a nuclear
war that wrecks all parties. Consequently
limited wars with limited objectives must
henceforth be the only resort when policy
requires support by military means. Upon
investigation I find that this was perceived by
some alert minds almost as soon as it
happened; by former Ambassador George
Kennan for one, who wrote in 1954, when
everyone else was bemused by the Bomb, that
nuclear weapons had not enlarged the scope
of war but exactly the opposite, that "the day
of total wars has passed, and that from now
on limited military operations are the only
ones that could conceivably serve any
coherent purpose."
The significance of this development for
the military man is profound. It means that
he will be used more for political or
ideological ends than he was in the past, at
least in the American past. The effect is
bound to be disturbing because, as the British
General, Sir John Winthrop Hackett, recently
said in a talk to our Air Force Academy,
"Limited wars for political ends are far more
likely t o be pr o d u c t i v e of moral
strains. . . than the great wars of the past."
The United States, it is hardly necessary to
remark, is already suffering from the truth of
that principle.

IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE

What d o e s t h e change imply for
generalship? "Has the Army seen the last of
its great combat leaders of senior rank?" I
quote that question from the recent book
Military Men by Ward Just, correspondent of
The Washington Post. Will there still be scope
for those qualities of personal leadership that
once made the difference? In the past it was
the man who counted: Clive who conquered
India with 1100 men; Cortez who took
Mexico with fewer; Charles Martel who
turned back the Moslems at Tours; Nelson
who turned back Napoleon at Trafalgar (and
incidentally evaluated one source of his
8

prowess when he said, "If there were more
Lady Hamiltons there would be more
Nelsons." Though that might be thought to
please the Women's Lib people who are down
on me already, I am afraid it won't because
from their point of view it's the wrong kind
of influence. Anyway, that factor too may
vanish, for I doubt if love or amorous triumph
will play much role in inspiring generals to
greater feats on the advisory or Vietnamizing
level).
Above all, among the men of character who
as individuals made a historic difference, there
was Washington. When, on his white horse he
plunged into the midst of panicked men and
with the "terrific eloquence of unprintable
scorn" stopped the retreat from Monmouth,
he evoked from Lafayette the tribute, "Never
have I seen so superb a man."
Is he needed in the new army of today
whose most desired postgraduate course, after
this one, it has been said, is a term at the
Harvard Business School? To fill today's
needs the general must be part diplomat, part
personnel manager, part weapons analyst, part
sales and purchasing agent. Already General
Creighton Abrams has been described by a
r e p o r t e r a s t w o generals: o n e a
" hell-for-leather, jut-jawed battlefield
commander and the other a subtle and
infinitely patient diplomat." For his
successors the second role is likely soon to
outweigh the first.
Out of that total human activity, physical,
intellectual and moral, how much will be left
for the general to do? Given chemical
detectors and people-sniffers, defoliators and
biological weapons, infrared radar and
electronic communication by satellite, not to
m e n t i o n , a s once conceived by Mr.
McNamara, an invisible electric fence to keep
out the enemy, the scope for decisionmaking
in the field must inevitably be reduced.
Artillery and even infantry fire, I understand,
will be targeted by computers, extending
from pocket size models in the soldier's pack
all the way to the console at headquarters.
This is supposed to raise the dazzling prospect
of eliminating human error, like Professor
Skinner's vision of eliminating human evil by
the teaching machine. The realization of

either of those prospects, I can guarantee you
as a historian, has about the same degree of
probability as the return of the dinosaur.
The change that could be the most
momentous would be a change in the relation
of the military to the state. This is sensitive
territory with potential for trouble, and I am
entering here into an area of speculation
which you may find refutable, and certainly
arguable.
Traditionally the American Army has been,
and consciously has considered itself, the
neutral instrument of state policy. It exists to
carry out the orders of the Government. In
order to do so without hesitation or question,
the officer corps has maintained, on the
whole, a habit of nonpartisanship, at least
skin-deep, whatever individual ideological
passions may rumble beneath the surface.
When it is ordered into action, the Army does
not ask "Why?" or "What for?" In the past
that has been a fundamental presumption.
But can it last when the military find
themselves being sent to fight for purposes so
speculative or so blurred that they cannot
support a legal state of war? You may say
that it is a matter of semantics, but semantics
make a good test. As a writer I can tell you
that trouble in writing clearly invariably
reflects troubled thinking, usually an
incomplete grasp of the facts or of their
meaning.
One wonders what proportion of officers in
Southeast Asia today get through a tour of
duty without asking themselves "Why?" or
'"What for?" As they make their sociopolitical
rounds in the future will that number
uncomfortably grow? That is why the defunct
principle that a nation should go to war only
in self-defense or for vital and immediate
national interest was a sound one. The nation
that abides by it will have a better case with
its own citizens and certainly with history. No
one could misunderstand Pearl Harbor or have
difficulty explaining or defining the need for
a response. War which spends lives is too
serious a business to do without definition. It
requires definition-and declaration. No
citizen, I believe, whether military or civilian,
should be required to stake his life for what
some uncertain men in Washington think is a
9

General Eisenhower (center) shown in Liege, France with Generals Patton, Bradley,
Hodges, Simpson and others during World War I I .
military arm remains under civilian control.
Did not Truman fire MacArthur?
It is true that in America the military has
never seriously challenged civilian rule, but in
late years it hardly needs to. With a third of
the national budget absorbed by military
spending, with the cost of producing nuclear
and other modern weapons having evidently
no limits, with 22,000 defense contractors
and 100,000 subcontractors operating in the
United States, with defense plants or
installations located in 363 out of 435
Congressional districts, the interlocking of
military-industrial interests grips the economy
and pervades every agency of government.
The new budget of $83.4 billion for
defense represents five times the amount
allotted to education and nearly forty times
the amount for control of pollution (our
Government having failed to notice that
pollution by now is a graver threat to us than
the Russians). It costs an annual average of
about $10,000 to maintain each man in
uniform compared to a national expenditure
of $1,172.86 for each person in the United
States; in other words, the man in uniform
absorbs ten times as much. The Pentagon,

good idea in gamesmanship or deterrence or
containment or whatever is the governing idea
of the moment.
If the military is to be used for political
ends, can it continue to be the innocent
automaton? Will the time come when this
position is abandoned, and the Army or
members of it will question and judge the
purpose of what they are called upon to do?
Not that they will necessarily be out of
sympathy with government policy. Generally
speaking, American policy since the onset of
the cold war has been the containment of
communism with which, one may presume,
the Army agrees. But the questions grow
complex. What about Russia vis-a-vis China?
What about India vis-a-vis Pakistan where
recently we skirted the consequences of folly
by a hair. What about the Middle East?
Suppose we decide that unless we rescue Syria
from Russian influence, Iraq will fall? or
suppose we transpose that principle to South
America? You can play dominoes on any
continent. What happens if we blunder again
into a war on the wrong side of history?
That is not the military's fault, the military
will reply. It is a civilian decision. The
10

where lies the pulse of all this energy and
activity, spends annually $140,000,000 on
public relations alone, nearly twice as much as
the entire budget of the National Endowment
for Arts and Humanities. When military and
military- connected interests penetrate
government to that extent, the government
becomes more or less the prisoner of the
Pentagon.
In this situation, the location of ultimate
responsibility for policymaking is no longer
clearly discernible. What is clear is that while
the military exerts that much influence in
government, it cannot at the same time retain
the stance of innocence.
It used to be that any difficulty of
assignment could be taken care of under the
sheltering umbrella of Duty, Honor, Country.
As long as you had a casus belli like the Maine
or the Alamo you could get through any
dubious expedition without agony. The West
Point formula may no longer suffice. Country
is clear enough, but what is Duty in a wrong
war? What is Honor when fighting is reduced
to "wasting" the living space-not to mention
the lives-of a people that never did us any
harm? The simple West Point answer is that
Duty and Honor consist in carrying out the
orders of the government. That is what the
Nazis said in their defense, and we tried them
for war crimes nevertheless. We undercut our
own claim at Nuremberg and Tokyo.
When fighting reaches the classic formula
recently voiced by a soldier in the act of
setting fire to a hamlet in Vietnam, "We must
destroy it in order to save it," one must go
further than duty and honor and ask, "Where
is common sense?" I am aware that common
sense does not figure in the West Point motto;
nevertheless soldiers are no less subject to
Descartes' law, "I think, therefore I am," than
other mortals. Thinking will keep breaking in.
That is the penalty of abandoning the purity
of self-defense as casus belli. When a soldier
starts thinking, according to the good soldier
Schweik, "he is no longer a soldier but a lousy
civilian." I do not know if it will come to that
but it serves to bring in the civilian point of view.

Does civilian society really want the Army
to start thinking for itself? Does this not raise
all sorts of dread potentials for right-wing
coups or left-wing mutinies? While the
military normally tends to the right, there
have been other cases: Cromwell's New Model
Army overturned the King, the naval mutiny
at Kronstadt and desertions from the front
brought on the Russian Revolution. Already
we have a dangerously undisciplined enlisted
force in Vietnam, which admittedly does not
come so much from thinking as from general
disgust. While this development is not
political, from what one can tell, it is
certainly not healthy.
FINAL PROBLEM

A final problem is the question of the
military's cherished separateness from civilian
society. America has never encouraged the
evolution of a military caste, yet a certain
sense of a special calling has developed, as it is
bound to do among men who have chosen a
profession involving risk of life. That choice
sets them apart, gives them a sense of mission,
unites them in a feeling of belonging to a
special band. They want to feel separate, I
believe; they want the distinction that
compensates to some extent for the risk of
the profession, just as the glitter and pomp
and brilliant uniforms and social prestige
compensated the armies of Europe. Yet if the
military man must now begin to ask himself
the same questions and face the same moral
decisions as the civilian, can his separateness
long endure?
CONCLUSION

I know that I have wandered far from my
assignment, but I raise these questions
because it seems to me that generalship will
have to cope with them from now on. The
trouble with this talk, as I imagine will now
have become visible, is that I have none of the
answers. That will take another breed of
thinker. I can only say that it has always been
a challenge to be a general; his role, like that
of the citizen, is growing no easier.
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